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Representations and social coordination of action  
 
Saadi Lahlou1 
 
Synthèse : 
L'observation du monde monde quotidien, notamment dans l'entreprise, fait apparaître que les 
individus ont constamment recours à des artefacts (textes, messages...). Ceux-ci sont des 
représentations publiques, qui rendent visibles et disponibles à un grand nombre d'acteurs un état de 
choses passé, présent où à venir ("constat", "projet", "objectif"...). Ceci afin que, individuellement, 
chacun puisse agir conformément au cadre de référence collectif.  
On montre sur un exemple comment un telle représentation publique permet de réaliser, 
collectivement, un état de choses prévu par quelques uns (en l'occurrence, comment une conférence se 
réalise à partir de l'appel à communications). Cet exemple trivial permet de clarifier le rôle des 
représentations circulantes dans la coordination de l'action et la division du travail. 
On montre, en particulier, que les systèmes de représentations sociales (c'est-à-dire, à la fois publiques 
et reconnues comme telles, et orientées vers l'action) permettent de : 
- réaliser une division active du travail, dans laquelle chaque opérateur fabrique lui-même son 
programme de travail à partir de la représentation qu'il reçoit ; 
- coordonner l'action dans le temps et l'espace entre opérateurs (en permettant à des acteurs distants de 
travailler sur le même objet comme s'ils étaient en coprésence). 
 
Le lien avec la théorie de l'action située permet de montrer comment, concrètement, la représentation, 
actualisée en contexte, permet de construire des actions pertinentes en utilisant les ressources 
disponibles localement. On montre que ce système est à la fois plus performant qu'un système de 
distribution a priori du travail (parce qu'il permet d'utiliser les ressources locales, et d'économiser des 
explications) et en même temps plus robuste (parce qu'il est plus flou et permet donc de s'adapter aux 
contextes locaux qui ne pourraient pas être vus depuis une coordination centralisée). 
On montre également que, paradoxalement, la représentation n'a pas besoin d'être la représentation "de 
quelque chose qui existe" pour jouer son rôle de coordination. 
 
 
1. Why use the theory of social representations ? 
 
We are interested here in the mechanisms of co-ordinated action, and we shall investigate the question 
within the theoretical framework of social representation theory. We shall use the ordinary office work 
for demonstration field. Why social representations ? Why office work ? 
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Co-ordinated action implies that actors share some common, and pragmatic, views of the objects and 
concepts of the setting within which and upon which they act. At the level of society, the setting is 
"the World", and such common mental constructs, called "social representations" [Moscovici, 1961], 
are "a kind of knowledge, socially constructed and shared, having pragmatic purpose and contributing 
to build a common reality for the community" [Jodelet, 1989]. Those shared constructs stand as a 
common reference system for members of a given cultural group. They are shared by the members of 
the group, and the group assumes that they are shared. 
The existence of such objects as social representations has naturally been recognised in other 
disciplines concerned with groups and psychological processes (anthropology, sociology, cognitive 
science, economics, game theory, etc.), sometimes under other names. Culture, common sense, 
schemata, conventions, common knowledge - to name those only - roughly refer to the same system of 
common referents through which socialised beings think their environment. So, various theoretical 
frameworks allow studying those social/mental constructs which social psychologists call social 
representations2. 
Still, social psychology, the discipline in which the concept is most central and salient, has, over years 
of continuous focus on the question, developed the largest corpus of data, as well as sophisticated 
theoretical and technical apparatus for their description and study [see Jodelet & Ohana, 1993, for a 
review]. The current structural theory of social representations proposes to figure social 
representations as combinations of basic nuclei -that is some elemental concepts, "cognems", or traits, 
that are mentally associated in the subject's minds, constituting the core and peripheral elements of the 
representation [Abric, 1993 ; Guimelli et Rouquette, 1992]. Unlike many models of shared mental 
constructs coming from other disciplines, this model has been supported with empirical evidence from 
a large range of studies ; and methods fit for exploring and describing the representation's structure are 
available [e.g. : Abric 1994a &b ; Flament 1992, 1993, 1994 ; Guimelli 1994 ; Lahlou 1995a ; Moliner 
1992, 1994 ; Rouquette 1994]. 
Social representations can serve as a World's user's manual. In context, for individual actors, they 
potentially generate action scripts articulating the basic nuclei, hereby providing co-ordinated action at 
the scale of society [Lahlou, 1995a, 1996b]. 
It is this co-ordinating role of social representation that we shall address here. 
 
At a smaller scale than society, in formal groups and organisations, where specific tasks have to be 
accomplished, the need for co-ordination is more obvious. It is also easier to study. As March and 
Simon [1958, 1991 pp. 2-3] point it out, communication canals in formal organisations are much more 
specific and explicit than the mass media, in their circuits and content. The study of specific, limited 
tasks in formal organisations therefore provides a good field for detailed study of the mechanisms by 
which actors use representations and communication to co-ordinate their actions. As Cicourel [e.g. : 
1994] demonstrates, in this co-operation process, social organisation, social interaction and 
information processing are intricated. This interaction is complex, but studying the overt aspects of the 
interaction can shed light on its mechanisms, provided that description is done at a very fine grain of 
detail. 
And indeed, detailed description of the situated action that occurs when individuals interact 
collectively with representational artefacts has brought great progress in our understanding of the role 
of shared representation in co-ordinated action [Conein & Jacopin, 1994 ; Hutchins, 1994, 1995]. This 
approach stresses the importance of public representations -of objects, tasks, or states of the world- in 
                                                     
2 The term "REpresentation" unfortunately carries inadequate connotations in some other disciplins, where it is 
associated with a naïve epistemology considering that there would be "real, given, objects in the world" which 
produce  "an image of those objects in the brain", and leaving out the constructive aspects of cognition. This 
leads to deeep misunderstandings with, for example, some branches of cognitive science. 
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the co-ordination of actors. In the course of action, and of propagation of representations, large parts 
of the representation are made public in the form of documents, messages, plans, or various 
information artefacts (e.g. : instruments, measurement devices...). Following Hutchins [1994] we 
consider that studying those public representations thus enables us to view the contents of the "black 
box" of the system, more easily than trying to peep inside the subject's mind, were lay another, but less 
accessible, version of the representation. 
 
All these public representations (documents, plans, messages...) are called "information" by the 
subjects. But what exactly is information ? On the field, obviously, information is a means of co-
ordination. Let's have a closer look at what it is made of. 
 
2. The nature of "information" 
In the course of a current research programme « Information in the workplace » [Lahlou & Fischler, 
1996], aiming at understanding what is the final outcome of information flow (and overflow) in formal 
organisations, we obtained the structure of what "information" means in common language. We used 
systematic analysis of dictionary definitions of all the terms connoting by « information », with a 
method designed for exploring the structure of social representations.  
The method extracts the basic nuclei of social representation from discourse samples produced by an 
informed source (a population, a dictionary...) [Lahlou, 1995a, 1996a]. A corpus of statements 
(sentences in natural language) about the object (here : "information") is obtained through association 
technique, then processed with a lexical data statistical analysis software, ALCESTE [Reinert, 1983], 
yielding classes of statements with similar lexical content. Those classes are considered as the basic 
nuclei. This method of interpretation [Lahlou, 1995b] is a kind of quantified, detailed, content 
analysis, aiming at the « connections » [Whorf, 1956] between traits, that is, the association links 
which are common in a given culture. Here, we used a large French dictionary (Le Grand Robert) as 
public source. 
Seven nuclei [details in : Lahlou, 1994] have been identified as elements of the representation of 
"information". The first three, Media, Code and Knowledge, describe aspects of the objets classically 
studied by [Shannon & Weaver, 1948], a domain improperly called « information theory » since it 
does not deal with the information meaning, but with its transmission. We suggested [Fischler & 
Lahlou, 1995] the neologism of "recom" (representation coded on media) to name the observable units 
of transmitted "information". 
Recom (fig. 1) is "a piece of information", an empirical information unit, that can be "handled", used 
or processed by subjects -and observed. For example, a memo (instructions written in English on a 
sheet of paper), a letter, a film, a sign, etc. are recoms. This concept has proved useful in our field 
observations.  
 
Four other nuclei were found in the analysis of information. They refer to various forms of recom 
propagation. Acquisition and Warning are one-way transits of recoms, coming to or emitted by the 
subject. Another nucleus, Education, is a co-operative transfer of recoms from one subject to another.  
Figure 1 : The recom 
media
code
representation
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The last, Instituting, is the most interesting for our organisational studies. The underlying phenomenon 
is that of an official explicitation of something, before witnesses, in the legal sense of "statement". The 
crucial point is this collective validation of a state-of-things (further abbreviated into « ST »), in the 
most constructionnist perspective. This validation can be established by institutions or individuals 
collectively delegated (doctors, experts, judges, commissions, etc. : any agent with legitimate 
authority). This nucleus, which underlines the procedural aspects of information and its institutional 
role in the founding of social reality, is pertinent for our research in the workplace. It enlightens the 
role of memorandums, programmes, reports, meetings, regulations etc., which constitute a large 
amount of the so-called paperwork and red tape. 
 
Finally, we'll say that :  
A piece of information is a representation of a state-of-things3. This representation is publicly 
available in the form of recoms, which are, fortunately, observable phenomena. 
The propagation of recoms may take various forms, and may provoke changes in the receivers. We are 
here coherent with Bateson's view [1957, 1961]: information is a difference that makes a difference ; 
or : the news of a difference. And also with MacKay [1972, p. 8] : "Information-for-an-organism is 
operationally definable as that which confirms or changes its internal representation of its world." 
 
3. An empirical approach 
This first sight at the problem led us to set up observation protocols focused on the use of recoms in 
the workplace. In two large organisations, 30 (2x15) office workers were investigated with a protocol 
using psycho-social and cognitive techniques. Semi-directive interviews were combined with detailed 
description, by the subjects, of what they did with the incoming "information" (in fact : recoms). Then 
subjects were asked to comment a thorough "office-check", where they would describe the nature and 
content of their desktop, files, stacks, drawers, shelves etc.  
Interviews were tape-recorded and reviewed by the interviewers. 
The analysis of this rich material yielded various results, including some cues on the mechanisms of 
"information overflow" [Fischler & Lahlou, 1995]. We shall for our purpose here concentrate on a 
single case that will root our model.  
 
3.1 The objects studied 
Activities of individual subjects in the company (actors) seem to be oriented towards modifying the 
state of a given setting, their work environment. Depending on their specific role and position, actors 
will focus on a given set of objects that constitute their relevant work environment, which we call their 
"ergotope" (their work biotope [Fischler & Lahlou, 1995]). Those environments will differ from actor 
to actor : what is relevant for engineers is not necessarily relevant for accountants. Still, all actors more 
or less share some elements of their environment with others, so that communication remains possible 
at least on those elements.  
The appropriate cognitive system to study is the actor plus his close environment (e. g. his desk and 
office room -or territory-, close colleagues, and technical equipment), which we call the "workcell". 
                                                     
3 "Bild" (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1961: 2.1 et seq. pp. 50-51). In this "picture", the elements are linked to one 
another as the elements of the objects they represent. In our perspective, the meta-communication elements 
helps structuring every message received into a representation of a ST. What is apparently an « order  given by 
B to A» or « a joke », is  received as the recom : « the representation of A ordering to B to do this ; or « A 
representing this story as a joke » etc.  
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Albert is the actor. His office (room) is his territory. Albert + his territory and what it contains are the 
work cell. Albert’s company, its clients, its suppliers, are Albert’s ergotope.  
The territory contains some overt representations of the ergotope, that serve as accessible and handy 
references of the ergotope for the actor. For instance, a given client (or a project) will be represented 
by a file (paper or computer). Actors compute upon those artefacts, which in turn propagate 
representations until they finally emerge somewhere in the real world in the form of an action 
modifying a ST. For instance, an accountant A will "pay" an employee E by running a specific 
computer program on the section of a payroll file that represents E. This operation will in turn 
propagate a series of recoms (bank order, etc.) in distant workcells, that will eventually end into E 
getting a handful of banknote. But A might never see E "in person" ; all he knows is E's numerical 
representation as a file. And all he needs to know is how to deal with A's numerical representation4. 
Obviously, material representations -recoms- do play a major role in co-ordinated action ; they (and 
not what they are supposed to represent) are the objects which are really manipulated and processed by 
actors. To understand how, let us focus on the post-it case. 
4. The post-it case 
One of our subjects says (translated) : 
" Subject : Well, in the morning I have more or less 5 messages [in the phone answering 
machine]  
and generally those are messages left from the day before most of the time (...) 
Interviewer : What do you do then ? 
S : I take notes (...) I have post-its generally (...)" 
 
The subject receives recoms, in the form of oral messages on his answering machine. As he listens, he 
transcribes (parts of) them on post-its. Post-its are more handy and stable recoms than vocal 
                                                     
4  This is what Roqueplo [1990, p. 75] calls "savoir décalé". 
Figure 2 : The "ergotope" and its projection in the subject's territory 
Ergotope
Territory
Actor
The Company and its environment work cell
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messages ; they can be handled, re-ordered, etc. without saturating the fragile working memory of the 
actor. 
 
Then he tries to "process" the content of the recom (by calling back, executing or planning some 
task...), and disposes of the original media (the vocal message, the post-it : infra, line 11). Often, the 
"recom processing" is ended by re-transcribing some action script to do (e.g. : GO TO a meeting) on 
his agenda (cf. infra line 12).  
In doing so, the subject has applied twice in a row (to the vocal message, then to the post-it) the 
"incoming recom processing cycle" (decoding, re-transcription, disposal : Figure 3). 
 
The sequence as described by the subject is more complex. He tries to process the recoms (the post-its) 
right away (line 1), to avoid (another) transient re-transcription on his agenda. He can’t (line 5), and 
that leads him to build a buffer system (line 6). 
1. " (...) the post-its, well, I leave them to see whether I can process them right away.  
2. If I can't process them,  
3. then I rewrite [literally "réinscris". He means : copy] them,  
4. well that is the case for instance this morning,  
5. the post-its I couldn't process ["traiter"] them yet, well,  
6. so I stick them in front on my agenda.  
7. And if I can't process them, if I'm sure that I can't process them because I don't have the 
information,  
8. [because] I can't call back the person or (s)he is not available,  
9. then I keep them in the organiser,  
10. so I put them in the column "done/to do".  
11. So I shall throw away the post-it  
12. and keep this in fact in my agenda...  
13. That's the way I do" 
Obviously, the subject uses many information artefacts (answering machine, post-it, agenda...), to 
cope with the incoming representations, and guide his own behaviour, immediately and in the future. 
He does so by giving himself instructions or data on his agenda (a structured media, which has, in-
built, an action-triggering characteristic). Hereby he modifies his own cognitive environment, with the 
contents of the representation received through the recom, so that this environment will provide him, 
Figure 3 : opening a recom in the incoming cycle 
media
code
representation
decoding
retranscription
disposal of media
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later, at the right moment, relevant resources for action (data and instructions). The feedback 
properties of the setting are hereby manipulated by the individual. One may notice here, that what is 
usually considered as a single actor (e.g. "Albert"), lasting through time and space, can be considered 
as a population of short sighted, instantaneous and context driven actors (Albert[t]), occupying a series 
of successive locations in time and space, and co-ordinating with "himself" by sending stimuli to his 
successive occurrences : Albert(t) guides Albert (t+n) by writing on his agenda what to do. We shall 
come back to this point later.  
What is now interesting to us is this re-transcription process (line 12, where by «this» our interviewee 
refers to the representation). To make this process more understandable, we shall describe it on 
another (real) example of which we can share the references with the reader5. In the course of this 
process, we can capture "live" the appearance of social representations in their co-ordinating role. 
5. The Conference announcement case 
description : Let us say  subject "Albert" receives by the mail on Sept. 1st, 1995, the following recom 
(Figure 4). 
    UNIVERSITE DE PROVENCE  
    (Aix-Marseille I) 
  UFR PSYCHOLOGIE,  SCIENCES DE L'EDUCATION 
 
 
LA TROISIEME CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE  
sur les 
 REPRESENTATIONS SOCIALES AURA LIEU 
 
 
les Vendredi 27, samedi 28, dimanche 29, lundi 30 Septembre 1996 
à Aix-en Provence et Montpellier (France) 
 
Date limite de réception de demande de communication  
(1/2 page en français ou anglais) 
le 2 Mars 1996 
 
A envoyer à : 
Professeur Jean-Claude Abric 
Université de Provence - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale 
29 ave. R. Schumann 
13621 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1 
Tél (33) 42 95 38 12 - 42 20 74 81 - 42 95 38 17 
Fax (33) 42 95 74 81 - 42 20 59 05 
 
Des  informations pratiques complémentaires seront envoyées début janvier 1996. 
 
 
This recom is coded in French on a paper media, and includes the following (representational) 
elements : the date of a conference (September 27 to 30, 1996), the location (Aix en Provence), the 
deadline for submission (half a page, in French or English, due March 2, 1996) ; the submission 
                                                     
5  Otherwise we would -and this is not feasible in this short paper- have to explain all the background of life at 
work in EDF Research Division or La Poste Headquarters, which were our actual research fields. 
Figure 4 : The announcement -call for papers 
 8 
address with fax and telephone ; it comes with a response coupon, the fee, and a tentative programme. 
The recom has been emitted as a warning by Pr. Abric's secretariat. This recom institutes a state-of-
things-to-be ("ST2B"). It provides Albert (one of the many addressees who acquire the recom) the 
representation of this possible meeting.  
 
interpretation : 
Albert constructs in his mind his own representation of the ST2B by mobilising his previous 
representations of the various elements present in the recom, of which some are social representations 
("a conference", "social psychology", "Aix-en-Provence"...), and some are idiosyncratic 
representations (Pr. Abric as known by Albert, memories of the 2nd Conference last year, etc.). In 
doing so, because he has the appropriate code and reference library -the representations-, Albert 
unfolds the recom into implicatures [Sperber & Wilson, 1986] and develops a much richer and 
informative representation than the few signs on the paper seemed to convey at first sight. The first act 
of the drama is set : the representation of a ST2B has propagated from the Conference organising 
committee to one of the potential actors (and, in fact, to hundreds of potential actors because the same 
scene that takes place in Albert's office also happens in the offices of all of the addressees of the 
announcement). 
Albert considers the representation, and takes decisions about his possible contribution to the 
realisation of this ST2B, by including various elements of his own context : does he have the time and 
resources, etc. Eventually, he will check a few other elements (just as our subject quoted earlier does 
with his messages). He applies the incoming recom processing cycle.  
 1. He re-transcribes various elements on his agenda for 1996. Page March 2 : «deadline 
abstract Aix". Pages September 27 to 30 : «Conf. R. S. Aix». Those are mere re-transcriptions. 
 2. Page February 5 : «write abstract paper Aix RS». This is the result of a computation, 
because Albert knows it will take some time to find the time to write the abstract, so he sets a date way 
in advance [Berry, 1994]. 
 3. By processing his representations of Aix, Conference etc. He creates another recom, a 
memo for his secretary, which he staples with the announcement : «I will go there, please send 
subscription and book hotel & tickets».  
 4. Makes a photocopy of the Announcement and stores it in a cardboard file labelled "Future 
congresses"  
 
In doing so, he has : 
 1. Transformed the representation of ST2B into action scripts (« send abstract », « go to 
conference »). 
 2. "Metabolised" the information by planning a sub-task (« write abstract ») ; which unfolds 
from the situated decoding of the recom. 
 3. Metabolised the information by creating and launching co-ordinated sub-tasks that will be 
dispatched to other actors (secretary). 
 4. Created in his office environment an overt (paper file) representation of an external object 
(the Conference) that is pertinent for his activity. 
The recom has been "metabolised" into modifications of the workcell. 
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As clearly appears, recoms, especially in their stable form of papers or files, are local inscriptions of 
parts of the representation of a state-of-things. As already noted by Norman [1993], these objects 
localised in the world tend to move or disappear less; therefore they can play the role of an external 
memory, less fragile than human memory. Which is shown by their role of reminders of actions-to-do. 
In this perspective, the actor's environment can be seen as an overt, stable, storage space for recoms. In 
the course of action, the actor uses this context or setting as a resource ; he extracts the pertinent 
representational elements as an input for his computations, in combination with other inputs 
("internal" representations, incoming recoms ...). 
 
6. Recom co-ordination 
Another phenomenon that appears and is crucial to our point here is that inscriptions play a key role in 
representation dissemination and actor co-ordination.  
To enlighten this point, let us come back to our example of the Conference announcement. Once all 
the addressees of the announcement have received their own recom in the mail, each one will 
"manage" to play his own part in the realisation of the global scenario. All those individual plays will, 
if all goes well, finally lead to the collective emergence of the ST2B (here, the Conference).  
The single representation of the ST2B coded in the recom (the announcement) has generated 
numerous locally adapted scripts. This with a potency far beyond what a precise plan could have done.  
Indeed, suppose that the Conference committee had proceeded in another way, by breaking down the 
making of the Conference into small tasks, then had given detailed instructions to each actor. Albert 
would have received a huge instruction book, one of which chapters would have been titled "Getting 
there", and starting more or less like that : "On October 26th, in the evening, take your suitcase (refer 
to chapter 9 "making your suitcase") and your raincoat (ref. chap. 26 : "how to dress"). Open the 
door (see glossary) of your apartment and step out (ref. chap. 6 ("basic bodily movements") section 
8.2.4.2.9 : « advanced combinations involving doors »). Go down the stairs of your house (ref. chap. 
138 : "how to use buildings") and walk to the metro (ref. chap. 22 : "transportation" and annex LV: 
"map of Paris"). Go to the Gare de Lyon train station. There, find the appropriate train to Aix (see 
annex XI : map of France ; ref. chap. 22 and annex XXXIV : French railway schedules"). Get in the 
train ... etc.  
Figure 5 : A simplified schema of the "metabolisation" process [Fischler & Lahlou, 1995] 
decoding
retranscription
media disposal cycle
first sorting
pile A pile B
paperbasket
storage
transmission
limit of territory
sorting
action
metabolisation
sorting
buffer U buffer V  action programmes  
Y  Z
!
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And each of those chapters would have to send back to (classical) references like "How to read a 
railway schedule", then "How to read books", "Time and its measurement", then "How to move your 
arm and grasp a book" etc.  
No need to insist : the emergence of the Conference is the result of a million local tasks that have to be 
performed by the actors. Each actor will act differently (everybody's instruction book would be 
different). And the detail of action, being a complex sensori-motor script adapted to the context, is far 
too complex a problem to be forecasted and solved in every occurrence by the organising committee. 
In a way, this is subsidiarity. 
Still, all those individual scripts are coherent with the global representation of the ST2B. Provided that 
the announcement has been sent to a relevant population of addressees, all these local scripts will sum 
up harmoniously into realising all the constituting elements of the ST2B. (Of course, this never occurs 
for complex events, and an extra co-ordination structure is needed to check everything goes according 
to plans, and will give individual actors some feed-back. But this is the principle.) 
7. The magic that stands behind recoms 
So, a single, small recom like the announcement managed to generate such a complex co-ordination. 
How ? Because of social representations. The content of the recom is, potentially, for a recipient who 
shares the code, a representation of a ST2B. Each actor decodes it in his own pragmatic perspective. 
The amount of knowledge and potential scripts contained in the message is much larger than it seems. 
The decoding of the message creates a representation very large and complex, since every element in 
the recom triggers a full representation already existing in the recipient workcell. For instance, the 
location of Aix ("annex XI "map of France") is already present in the subject's mind. This is true of 
most references needed for decoding the recom. Most of this is included in what Norman [1972, p. 9] 
calls the subject’s «knowledge of the  world» :  
"When concepts are represented within memory they must fit within the framework provided by 
the knowledge of the world. This general world knowledge is likely to be extremely extensive, 
containing all the learned information that we have come to take for granted. (...) One view of 
the role of world knowledge is to consider it as a structural framework upon which newly 
acquired information must be fastened. This skeletal or schematic representation then guides 
both the interpretation of information and also the search for new information to fill the gaps left 
in the structure " 
 
What is not readily available in the subject’s mental equipment (Norman’s « knowledge of the 
world », which we social psychologists would probably call social representations) is usually available 
somewhere in his environment in the form of artefacts or recoms : a map, a colleague who knows, etc.  
As Shannon and Weaver [1948] noted, the signal is conventional : if it is agreed that the sign "X" will 
mean "King George's Bible", transmitting this single sign will have an equivalent result to transmitting 
the whole book. That’s what we do when we transmit representations through language : each word 
refers to an existing representational pattern in the recipient. As the recipient decodes it, the message 
unfolds into an internal simulation (something like Minsky's simulus) of what it conventionally 
represents. 
The very possibility of transmitting "information" through conventional signs presupposes that the 
addressee has, available, the necessary knowledge to decode and unfold the signal. This sends us back 
to the questions of common knowledge [Dupuy, 1992 : 49-95]6, relevance [Sperber & Wilson, 1986], 
                                                     
6 Specularity is "the mental act by which a human mind takes the perspective of another" and degree of 
specularity is "in a situation where this act [of specularity] is repeated a number of times, the number of 
successive embeddings "I think that you think he thinks..." minus one. Any finite specularity marks a certain 
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conversational logic [Grice, 1975] and semiotics in general. What we want to venture here is that these 
questions are only different formulations of the social representations problematics. The whole system 
works because it includes, already installed in the recipients, conventions : a reference system capable 
of generating relevant responses.  
 
The recom doesn’t "contain" all the instructions. It triggers the emergence of the ST2B by : 
a) stimulating the reference system to reconstruct locally an action plan for each actor ; 
b) using the local action resources.  
 
Co-ordination of action is made possible by : 
1) representability - the representation of the ST2B can be coded into a simple and economic recom, 
e.g. by symbolic language; and transmitted to destinators; 
2) specularity - the coding system (including the reference system) is shared by the actors ; 
3) generativeness - each actor will be able to reconstruct a richer representation of the ST2B from the 
recom by : 
 -a) unfolding each element of the recom into a personal element of representation 
 -b) arranging these elements together into a personal representation of the ST2B 
4) good will - each actor then tries to reify 'his' part of the ST2B. 
 
Co-ordination is made efficient because each workcell locally adapts its own scripts to the actual local 
context. 
 
In the course of action, social representations appear as the bricks with which the subjects will produce 
the master plan of what is expected (here, by the Conference committee) to emerge collectively. Social 
representations are the specular reference system. General representations are specified by other 
representations, so that the ST2B is not a fuzzy or general object, but can be very precisely specified. 
E.g. : this is not a Conference, but the 3rd Conference on Social Representations, in Aix, etc.  
 
7.1 Wild representations are procedural 
Representations guide, shape, form action. They are cognitive artefacts that are also decision and 
instruction tools : a World users’ manual. As a description of what something is supposed to be, or 
supposed to be made, they hereby give instructions of what to do to realise that something. Hereby, 
they are procedural representations, that can be interpreted into action, in the same way some 
computer languages imbed procedures within the representation (e.g. : GO TO (...) / PRINT (...) / 
STOP).  
"This method of imbedding procedures within the representation really means that the 
representational format for the knowledge in the representation (the data) and for the procedures 
(the programs) that operate upon the knowledge have the same format. (...) This means that the 
same information structure can be viewed as either data (declarative) or program (procedural) - 
and that is the key to this method of procedural representation." [Rumelhart & Norman, 1983, p. 
80]. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
degree of opacity, some deficit of reflexivity".[Dupuy, 1192, p. 68] Common Knowledge is of infinite 
specularity. "Intuitively, a proposition P in  a community of knowing subjects is CK [Common Knowledge] if : 
1) it is true ; 2) it is known of everyone ; 3) everyone knows the others know  it ; 4) everyone knows that 
everyone knows that the others know it etc. Ad infinitum." [Dupuy, 1192, p. 68, mediocre translation by SL] 
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This is another -cognitive- way of expressing that old social psychology classic that "representation is 
at the same time pattern and process". As we have shown, social representations, in the wild, indeed 
imbed such procedural nodes that can be interpreted as motor action in the outer world (e.g. : 
"acquire", "warn" supra ; or "take" in the representation of "eating" [Lahlou, 1995a]). We suspect that 
all social representations, as observed in the wild, are procedural by nature. But this remains to be 
proved. 
In our example here : an abstract is « a short paper in which the full-length paper is described and 
abbreviated »7. So, the author, when having to prepare his abstract, will just have to articulate the basic 
nuclei of the representation of « an abstract » and apply (act out) them to his own case, by modifying 
only those marginal elements that need to be adapted to his context [Lahlou, 1995a : 318-320]. Those 
adaptations of representation to the context might mostly concern, as in the cases noted by Moliner 
[1992, p. 325] peripheral nuclei of the representation, but they might in our view involve any 
elements. 
7.2 Specularity saves volume 
In using social representations as the common code between the emitter and the receiver, a tremendous 
economy of signal is achieved : only the relevant details and the general schemata are transmitted 
instead of transmitting a whole detailed representation of the ST2B. There is no need to transmit the 
description of the frameworks : they are already referenced in the addressee's 'knowledge of the world'. 
Only the reference code (e. g. the name of the reference) needs to be sent, with some marginal 
specifications.  
Two technical applications of the same system will crudely show its interest. The first one is the 
updating of data bases. Usually, only the modifications are transmitted, the whole data base doesn't 
need to be re-copied. 
The second comes from a satellite telecommunications company involved in mobile phones ; which 
also provides ground transportation firms cheap radio access to any truck in their fleet, wherever they 
are on the road within the U.S.. Messages are radio-cast by satellites to destinators (trucks). The 
company noticed that actual messages were very stereotyped8 (e.g. : « To Daniel Boone, Truck n° 12, 
Friday June 23rd, 7:00 AM: Go to Philadelphia, please load a cargo of frozen doughnuts, at FRIO 
(Glenside), and bring it to Pittsburgh  before tomorrow noon. Take care. Molly, central control», or 
« Please call at this number Mr. So-and-so », etc. Some messages are pretty long but involve very few 
variable segments. The solution adopted was to send « macro-instructions ». That is, the reference of a 
stereotyped message frame, and then the variable elements that complete it. E. g. the first message 
would become something like : « ref. N°25 / Philadelphia / frozen foods / FRIO (Glenside) / 
Pittsburgh / 29 h », where only the pertinent variables are specified, and « N°25 » refers to the type of 
macro-instruction (the framework representation) where the driver has to pick up some cargo and 
bring it to another location. The local terminal in the truck draws the referenced frame from its local 
data base and spells a nice full reconstituted message on the terminal screen, by filling, with the 
variables (Philadelphia etc.), the blanks in a pre-programmed frame. Much less than what appears on 
the screen has explicitly been transmitted. This economy is possible because the central control knows 
that the truck terminal shares the representation of the macro-instructions (specularity). This type of 
coding is very common in computer science. 
                                                     
7  The social representation of what a good abstract is probably richer : it must be teasing so that the paper is 
selected, provide the good references, have an exciting title, fit well into one of the workshops etc. We have no 
empirical data to describe what the social representation of a good abstract is ; this is just a fictitious example. 
8 The examples given are totally fictitious and coined for demonstration purposes. 
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In this respect, we notice that the social representation system is an elegant way of saving volume in 
communications. Instead of transporting the whole picture, only the instructions to build it are 
transmitted. The recipient will use his own local resources (knowledge of the world) to actualise the 
representation locally, using the pattern and instructions transmitted through the recom. 
 
7.3 The ready-made and the do-it-yourself 
In the general model, the recipient, confronted with an incoming recom, will try to understand it, that 
is set it into the framework of reference constituted by his « knowledge of the world », which is made 
of representations. Most of the time, the recom is coded by referring to patterns, schemata, scripts, that 
the sender knows are shared by the recipient : « social representations ». That is, to quote Jodelet again 
: "a kind of knowledge, socially constructed and shared, having pragmatic purpose and contributing to 
build a common reality for the community" [Jodelet, 1989]. For communication, social representations 
are the implicit reference code in a given culture9. 
In the receiver of recoms, social representations act as the « schemata » of Rumelhart & Norman :  
"We view a schema as a general model of a situation. (...) The act of comprehension can be 
understood as the selection of appropriate configuration of schemata to account for the situation. 
(...) The schema that will be selected will determine the interpretation of the situation and will 
direct processing attention to selected aspects of the situation. (...) Perhaps the best way to view 
this is to think of all the data written on a blackboard, with the schemata examining the 
blackboard for data relevant to themselves. When a schema sees something, it attempts to 
integrate the data into its organizational structure, and the puts new information onto the 
blackboard. Other schemata might react to these new data. Thus schemata are data driven in the 
sense that they respond to the existence of relevant data. Schemata perform conceptually driven 
guidance to the processing by using their internal conceptualizations to add new data to the 
blackboard, thereby guiding the processing of other schemata" [Rumelhart, & Norman, 1976, 
pp. 10-12] 
 
In our case, the "situation" is a ST represented in a recom. 
As we said, those representations are more than a communication code. They encrypt action scripts for 
the realisation (reification) of states-of-things. Because their description of objects is usually a 
constructive one. In this respect, social representations are mental computing tools. They are so 
because they are cultural artefacts, which cumulate the pragmatic knowledge of generations. They are 
tools that provide solutions, or at least guidelines, for everyday problem solving (how to use a door, 
how to take the train, how to make a good paper for a Conference...). There is a French term for that : 
« pensée toute faite » (ready-made thought). As we have seen, this ready-made thought is more or less 
a toolbox of standard elements or patterns ; which are locally customized and/or assembled into 
locally adapted patterns ; so the final result is a combination of ready-made and do-it-yourself. 
 
7.4 Information artifacts and social representations 
The existence of such tools guiding action has been pointed at by cognitive scientists. For instance, 
Hutchins (1987) comes up with the concept of mediation : 
"Mediation refers to a particular mode of organizing behavior with respect to some task by 
achieving coordination with a mediating structure that is not itself inherent in the domain of the 
task. That is, in a mediated performance, the actor does not simply coordinate with the task 
environment, instead, the actor coordinates with something else as well, something that provides 
                                                     
9 Of course, subcultures (e.g. technical) can have their own glossary of shared representations. 
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structure that can be used to shape the actor's behavior. [p. 1] (..) Language, cultural knowledge, 
mental models, arithmetic procedures, and rules of logic are all mediating structures too. So are 
traffic lights, supermarket layouts, and the contexts we arrange for each other's behaviors. 
Mediating structures can be embodied in artifacts, in ideas, in systems of social interaction, or in 
all of these at once." [p. 10]. 
 
We have also seen the stress put by Norman on "schemata". Theories all point at the idea that there 
must be some « macro-instructions », some cognitive references, guiding the actors. We have just 
suggested here that a crucial feature of such cognitive references is that they must be shared by 
the actors. And that sharing must be obvious (meaning : no participant questions the fact they 
are shared) ; this means specularity.  
 
There has been recently a major focus research on material artifacts as co-ordinating tools. They are 
indeed very important. Sometimes, artifacts hold more than could fit in a social representation, like the 
nautical charts described by Hutchins [1995 : 55-65]. But they must be considered in complementarity 
with mental artifacts : representations. 
 
Let us summarise : 
- co-ordination, as it needs communication, must rely on shared references to build in each performer 
the representation of the ST2B, and the fact they are shared must be known by all actors ; 
- the action is locally planned by performers, using the representation of ST2B as a master plan out of 
which they unfold what is relevant to their own part ;  
- the efficiency of co-ordination comes from the fact that local scripts are locally adapted by the 
performers, taking the constraints of their local context into account. 
 
The reference system must be shared, specularly, pragmatically oriented with a cognitive aspect 
(pattern recognition), and a constructive aspect (articulable into action scripts). This looks very much 
like the classical properties of social representations. May be co-ordination is one of the ecological 
finalities that contributed to give them those properties. 
 
8. Culture is a blackboard 
Anyway, what appears here is that social representations are the mental version of overt 
representations. They are the "internalised" functional equivalent of material objects that are present 
and accessible in the common setting of participants to a task ("public objects"). The co-ordinating 
quality of those public objects (e. g. a map) is that they are available and shared referents ("thing 
meant"). Hence, they can be inserted unambiguously in every participant's computations just by 
pointing at them. For instance, an office worker could point at a telephone set and tell the technician : 
"plug it [pointing at the phone] in here [pointing at a plug], not in this one [pointing at other] it is for 
the fax".  
Adequate co-ordination badly needs such unambiguous agreement on referents, and on what is to be 
done with them. What social representations allow is making the referents available to all in an 
ubiquitous way, so that actors and objects can co-ordinate without standing in the same geographic or 
temporal space. For instance, the office worker (« Albert ») could send a mail to the telephone utility, 
stating « Please come and install a telephone and a fax (standard model) for me. My office is n°112 in 
building Y, and please connect the phone on the plug below the window and the fax on the other 
one ». Then the technician will be able to execute the task even if Albert is not present. The technician 
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will locate the proper elements because he shares the general reference system, and because local 
specifications were provided in the recom, referring to local contextual clues publicly available in the 
setting. 
 
Social representations stand in a virtual space, accessible by all members of the group. In this 
perspective, Culture, as the storehouse of social representations, can be considered as a group's 
common, and virtual, blackboard, where social representations are inscribed.  
In this respect, shared referential systems (language is one, where social representations are the shared 
referents of « words ») connect the various individual universes into a global setting in which 
indexicality becomes possible in the absence of material referents. 
Indexicality is of course a crucial condition for co-ordination. 
9. The EDF phone list and other paradoxes 
An amazing feature of this referential system of representations is that it need not exactly map to a 
«material » referent.  
Let us take two examples. The first is the Conference again. Before September 26th, the Conference 
cannot be said to exist in reality : it is not observable. And after the 30th, it does not exist any more : 
only remain scattered memories, and some artefacts (proceedings...). From the 26th to the 30th, what 
can be observed is only a set of partial views. No such phenomenon as described by the announcement 
or its local representations in participants can be said to occur exactly according to the plan (absent 
speakers, last minute changes in workshops etc.), even if the general feature corresponds to it. Strictly 
speaking, the Conference of which the announcement was a representation never existed. Something 
happened, for sure, but not exactly what was planned. And exactly what was the Conference is a 
phenomenon inaccessible to global observation. 
The Conference is an emergent phenomenon that bootstrapped from its representation, in the sense 
that, as legend has it, the Baron of Munchhaüsen took off in the air by pulling his bootstraps [Raspe, 
1785]. But the phenomenon emerged from a representation of what ? This question has no clear 
answer. 
What is the status of the representation of the Conference that was mailed with the announcement ? 
Before the 26th of September, it is the representation of something that might exist in the future, the 
representation of a fiction, a possibility. After the 30th, we can state that it is a representation of 
something that never existed, even if a phenomenon that is closely linked to this representation indeed 
occurred between the 26th and 30th of September. This representation has no unambiguous referent : 
when observed, the-phenomenon-that-the-representation-is-supposed-to-refer-to does not exactly fit 
with the representation. The ST2B is a fictitious referent, which changes progressively as the dates of 
the Conference approach, and is monitored by the conference committee and the actors to get close to 
the target -and all actors do not agree on everything. Both the master plan and the local plans are 
adapted, just like the Seldon plan in the hands of the Second Foundation in Isaac Asimov’s science 
fiction novel. This view supports the controversed position [Wagner 1996 ;  Lahlou 1995a] that 
representation is no representation "of something".  
To use another metaphor, which Russel [1956, p. 5] mapped to the problem of knowledge : "(...) a 
traveller approaching a mountain through a haze : at first only certain large features are discernible, 
and even they have indistinct boundaries, but gradually more details become visible and edges become 
sharper". Only that, as you get close and details are revealed, the global shape is no more visible and 
only remains as a mental framework. 
One could even say that « the 3rd Conference » existed as such only as a social representation. As we 
saw, any other attempt to describe the phenomenon in a less fuzzy manner yields not « one object », 
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but only partial glimpses of something larger that is supposed to exist beyond observation : « the 3rd 
Conference », which something will forever stay a theoretical fiction. 
Still, in our case, it worked well as a representation should : it enabled co-ordination, and provoked the 
emergence of a phenomenon. Language provided a transient support for stabilising the referent as an 
object. This lexical object («The 3rd International Conference on Social Representations»), can be 
transmitted and manipulated, although what it stands for is unclear.  
We forward here the idea that it is precisely because words are fuzzy that language can play the role of 
a global reference system. If words were very accurately referring to definite objects, the actors would 
not find those very definite objects in their setting. E.g. it is pragmatic to say  « Please come and install 
a telephone» ; but it would not be efficient to replace "telephone" by a precise physical tridimensional 
description "T" of a telephone, specifying every atom. For such an accurately defined object probably 
does not exist in the technician's environment : the available telephone set in the technician's 
storehouse might differ from "T" by the position of one molecule ; and so the technician would not 
recognise it as a relevant instance of "T". This may sound exaggerated. But suppose that the technician 
is a robot, comparing "T", pixel by pixel, with its sight of its environment in order to find a match ? 
 
Another case will exemplify the problem of fictitious referents. EDF, the French electric utility, has a 
staff of around 118 000. There is a computerised phone list ("Athena"), stating addresses and positions 
of all agents, accessible by Minitel (telematics), and which can even be updated by the agents 
themselves. This list can be said to be a representation of the staff. Experience shows that this 
telephone list is never accurate, because sometimes you just can’t find in the list a person, whom you 
know is member of the staff, but just moved. One could say that the representation is « false ». But of 
what is it a representation ? Changes in the EDF organisation chart take place every second, although 
no change is fully instantaneous (what day exactly is one supposed to have changed, when we know 
that many people still come back in their previous affectation for some time to settle things properly, 
that no moving can be done in a second etc.). By the time the representation has propagated to the 
observer, the source has changed ; and God knows what biases were introduced during propagation, 
and interpretation ? « EDF » is an ever-changing phenomenon. EDF as « a material object », beyond 
the phenomenon, is only a theoretical fiction, as its boundaries and properties depend upon the system 
of description used. Still, it can be represented. 
So representations are fuzzy objects. They serve as referents for co-ordination, but they don’t need to 
refer to much more than themselves to serve as co-ordination tools. They are landmarks for 
communication, out of which we weave a fabric of ST2B that sometimes emerge as phenomena. The 
theory of speculative "bubbles" in stock exchange [Orlean, 1990], is another beautiful example of 
phenomena emerging from co-ordination upon a reference which has no other role than crystallising 
co-ordination. Self-fulfilling prophecies and anticipation mechanisms in economy in general are of the 
same feather. It seems that this kind of bootstrapping, where reality emerges from possibility with the 
support of representations, is after all a very frequent mechanism. 
10. Conclusion & perspectives 
That some socially shared cognitive objects are a key feature in the course of action, and co-ordinated 
action even more, is becoming a commonplace thought in cognitive research (cf. supra Cicourel, 
Norman, Hutchins...) ; and also in some other fields : sociology [Latour, 1989], anthropology 
[Sperber, 1996], not to speak about linguistics... It seems that, starting from different grounds, 
researchers are converging to that same notion of social representations upon which our discipline has 
worked so much. The constructive and referential properties of social representations have, since the 
beginning, been described as one of their main features : Moscovici calls them referential instruments 
(« instruments référentiels ») serving as unconscious patterns for many everyday actions [1961, 1976, 
p. 172], and serving for creating reality [Moscovici, 1988b]. Although those properties have been 
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accepted and described for long in our discipline, they often are incompletely understood by parent 
disciplines because most of the objects we study are so "social" in the sense of societal. They appear as 
hazy mountains to the tourist from other disciplins who come across our field. Therefore our 
theoretical and methodological achievements do not propagate as much as they could, although they 
could enlighten the study of social phenomena at a smaller scale. 
I believe further investigation of the detailed mechanism by which social representations are 
implemented at low level in everyday actions could bring us interesting theoretical perspectives. In this 
line of research, the fine approach and methods developed by the "situated cognition" researchers may 
be of great interest. 
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